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IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE AND VICARIOUS
LIABILITY: THE STUDY OF
A PARADOX*
FLEMING JAMES, JR.**

The lawyer of today takes vicarious liability as a matter of course.
And, by pretty much the same token, he takes the idea of imputed
contributory negligence as a matter of course. By the general American
law, Truck Owner - although altogether free from any personal fault is liable to Highway Traveler who is injured by the negligence of Truck
Owner's employee, Driver, while Driver is acting in the scope of his
employment. And if Highway Traveler negligently damages the truck,
Owner will be barred from recovering for this damage if Driver's
negligence also contributes to causing it.1 This is all perfectly familiar
doctrine, and it therefore seems natural. But upon further analysis
and after a longer look at history, several things about this situation
will loom up as passing strange. These things in turn will raise the
inquiries of whether vicarious liability or imputed contributory negligence may be justified at all; and, if either of them may be, whether
they should go hand in hand as they generally do now.
First, let us take that look at history. Not every lawyer of today
realizes that, while the doctrine of contributory negligence was developing during the nineteenth century, there were many ways in which
imputed contributory negligence was a lot broader than vicarious liability. 2 For example, there was the doctrine of identification, which

*This article was delivered as a speech at the Institute on Torts and Procedure
held March 7-8, 1957, by the College of Law of Florida Agricultural and Mechanical
University, Tallahassee, Florida.
OOB.A. 1925, LL.B. 1928, Yale University; joint author of CASES ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, THE LAW OF TORTS, and author

of numerous articles in legal periodicals; Professor of Law, Yale University.
12 HARPER and JAMES, TORTS c. 23 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS §54 (2d ed. 1955). This
rule was applied in Powell v. Jackson Grain Co., 134 Fla. 596, 184 So. 492 (1938).
2See, in general, Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis. L. REV. 193, 257 (1921);

Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831
(1932); James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REV. 340 (1954); Keeton,

Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 161 (1935); Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 FORDHAM L.
REV. 156 (1951); sources cited note 1 supra.
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imputed the negligence of the driver of a vehicle to all his passengers
when they sued for injuries caused them by third persons. In early
English and American cases this was applied occasionally even to defeat
the action of a passenger in a public vehicle such as an omnibus,3 a
ship,4 or a railroad train. 5 It was more often applied to defeat the
action of the driver's friend or a member of his family even though no
agency relationship existed between them.6 In other words, in his
suit against a third party each passenger in the vehicle was tarred
with the stick of the driver's contributory negligence, even though
he would not have been vicariously liable for the driver's negligence
if the third person had sued the passenger.
There were other instances. Some courts imputed a parent's custodial negligence to his minor child so as to bar the child's own action
against a stranger, though no one ever thought for a minute that
the stranger, if he was injured, could hold the child vicariously liable
for his parent's negligence in taking care of him. 7 There was also a
good deal of nineteenth century authority for imputing a bailee's
negligence to his bailor in the bailor's action against a stranger whose
negligence contributed to injuring the subject of the bailment.8
Not all of these rules were adopted in all states, but it is fair to say
that generally the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence was
broader than vicarious liability. This situation was not, however,
destined to last. Almost from the beginning the whole doctrine of
contributory negligence has been assailed as harsh and unduly strict.9
aThorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. (Man. G. & S.) 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (C.P. 1849).
4Cattlin v. Hills, 8 C.B. (Man. G. & S.) 123, 137 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.P. 1849).
sSee Lockart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. 151 (1863); Armstrong v. Lancashire & Y.
Ry., L.R. 10 Ex. 47 (1875); Bridge v. Grand Junction Ry., 3 M. & W. 244, 150 Eng.
Rep. 1134 (Ex. 1838), and treatment of this case in Thorogood v. Bryan, supra note 3.
6See, e.g., Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878). This seems not to have
been the law in Florida. Bessett v. Hackett, 66 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1953).
7Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. 1839); Annot., 15 A.L.R. 414 (1921)
(listing Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York as then following
this rule); cf. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goodenough, 55 N.J.L. 577, 28 Afd. 3 (1893).
Florida did not adopt this aspect of imputed negligence. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Bazemore, 85 Fla. 164, 96 So. 297 (1923).
sIllinois Cent. R.R. v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325, 27 So. 527 (1900); Smith v. Smith, 19
Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824); Forks Township v. King, 84 Pa. 230 (1877); Texas & P.
Ry. v. Tankersley, 63 Tex. 57 (1885).
9
See, e.g., 2 HIIAn and JAMs, TORTS c. 22 (1956); PRossER, ToRTS 284 (2d ed.
1955); Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEo. L.J. 674 (1934); Smith, Sequel to
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARv. L. Rav. 235, 253 (1913); Thayer, Public
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The last hundred years have been marked by constant inroads upon
it by courts and legislatures alike. 10 As this development progressed, it
is not surprising that attacks were made on imputed contributory negligence as well. Part of this attack was the suggestion that imputed contributory negligence should be cut down to those cases in which the
plaintiff would be vicariously liable if he had been sued as defendant.
As one writer, about the turn of the century, put it, "It is a poor
rule that won't work both ways."'" This suggestion was pretty widely
adopted. The "both ways test," as it is sometimes called, came to prevail and was adopted in the Restatement of Torts in the 'thirties.'1
But accident law is not a stable thing, and even as imputed negligence was being cut down to size - that is, to the same size as vicarious
liability - yeast was at work to enlarge the scope of vicarious liability.'1
This raises a question whether we shall continue to apply the "bothways test" and now expand imputed contributory negligence again
as we are expanding vicarious liability.
History, then, tells us that the rule that seems so familiar and
normal to us is a relatively new wrinkle and poses a question as to
its future course. But history alone cannot answer the question. For
the answer we are driven to ask what vicarious liability and contributory negligence are all about and how these concepts serve the interests
of society.
In our accident law the prevailing basis of liability is fault. This
represents, among other things, a moral judgment that it is fair to
visit liability upon the blameworthy but not upon the innocent and,
as a corollary, that only the innocent plaintiff may enforce that liability.
But, in order to satisfy this moral judgment, fault must be taken in

Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 340-42 (1913).
lOExamples of judge-made inroads are the last clear chance doctrine, Davies v.
Mann, 10 M. 9:W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842); the rules that contributory negligence is no defense to actions based on wanton and willful misconduct or to actions
based on strict liability or a nuisance, see 2 HARPER and JAMEs, ToRTs §§22.4- .9,
22.12- .14 (1956); and the change in the rules concerning burden of proof, id. §22.11.
Legislative inroads include statutes changing the burden of proof and statutes embodying a rule of comparative negligence. Ibid.
"LSee Gregory, supra note 2; Note, 32 A~t. L. REG. 763, 765 (1893).
12REsrATEMENT, TORTS §485 (1934).
13See in general 2 HARPER and JAzES,

TORTS c. 26 (1956). Examples are Southern
Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); the family car doctrine,
2 HARPER and JAMES, TORTS §26.15; statutory extensions of vicarious liability, id.
§26.16; FLA. STAT. §322.09 (3) (1955).
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the sense of personal moral shortcoming. The party to be charged must
voluntarily have chosen a wrong or an unreasonable course of action
when a better or safer alternative was open to him. He must have acted
willfully or unreasonably under all of the circumstances. If individualized fault is taken as the norm for liability or disability to recover, then
vicarious liability or disability to recover must be regarded as an exceptional solution, to be justified only for reasons of policy sufficient
in each case to warrant the exception. And certainly there is no general notion that innocent A must pay for, or be barred by, B's fault.
This was clearly pointed out by Holmes in his famous articles on
Agency;'14 and he concluded that vicarious liability could not be justified by reason, but only by a fiction.
In this, however, Holmes has few if any modern followers. Most
people today do justify vicarious liability on grounds of policy very
much like those that justify workmen's compensation, namely, that
employers of labor and owners of vehicles are better distributors of
the risks that their lawful activities create than are their victims' s - a
principle once recognized by the Supreme Court of Florida in the
notable case of Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson.26
The question remains whether this, or any other ground of policy,
justifies imputed contributory negligence. This rule clearly does not
further the compensation of accident victims. Quite the contrary; it
cuts them off from compensation. By the same token it does not generally aid in distributing accident losses among those whose conduct
causes accidents. Instead, it generally frustrates such distribution.
Further, imputed contributory negligence is scarcely needed as an
incentive to be careful in selection and control of employees, since
vicarious liability already supplies that incentive.
It will be seen, then, that the reasons of policy that emphatically
justify vicarious liability signally fail to justify imputed contributory
negligence. Rather they point in the opposite direction.
To the question, then, whether imputed contributory negligence

144 HARV. L. REv. 345, 5 id. 1 (1891).
15See Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54, 181 P.2d 645 (1947); Kohlman v. Hyland,
54 N.D. 710, 210 N.W. 643 (1926); Carroll v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 207 S.C. 339, 35
S.E.2d 425 (1945); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE
L.J. 584, 720 (1929); James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TuL. L. R-v. 161 (1954); Laski,
Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916); Wigmore, Responsibility for
Tortious Acts, 7 HARV. L. Rav. 315 (1894).
1680 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
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should be expanded as vicarious liability is expanded, the answer is
no. Indeed, there seems to be little if any justification for imputing
17
contributory negligence in any case to an innocent plaintiff.

"7Pragmatic considerations may in some cases justify imputing negligence to
those plaintiffs who regularly make provisions by insurance to cover their accident
losses. I have tried to explore this problem somewhat in Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340, 352-54 (1954). See also 2 HARPER and JAMEs, TORTS 127677 (1956).
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